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Abstract 
Title: FDI in western China - A study of the factors behind location choices of Nordic companies 
Authors: Marcus Gyllestål and Daniel Ekström 
Supervisor: Prof. Arne Bigsten 
Department: Department of Economics 
Pages: 51 
Background and problems: The extraordinary growth in China the last four decades has created 
large inequality within the country. Perhaps the most obvious is that between the developed coastal 
regions and the inland. To boost the economic development in the hinterland the Western 
Development Strategy was initiated in year 2000. In recent years the affected area has had the 
highest growth levels in all of China. At the same time more and more international companies is 
looking to invest in the area. 
Aim and Purpose: The aim of the study is to examine what effects the Western Development 
Strategy has had on investments in western China and how Nordic companies are acting in this 
environment.  
Method and data collection: The information was gathered in several ways. A quantitative study was 
done using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Further information on the situation 
and decisions of Nordic companies active in the Western regions was gathered through interviews. 
Thirdly interviews were also held with organisations that were working with companies that are 
planning, or have invested in Western China.  
Result and Conclusion: In the data analysis we find that the WDS has had an effect on the FDI inflow 
to western China. It is hard to draw any clear conclusions form the interviews on the effect of the 
WDS. The gross regional product is found has a positive effect on investments, suggesting that the 
local markets are important to investors and are becoming increasingly important to MNE’s. We find 
that wage has a negative effect on investments. Infrastructure and education level are not found to 
have any effect on the localization on FDI.  
We find that local markets are driving factor for the investments among Nordic companies. For the 
manufacturing companies also agglomeration was an important factor. Nordic companies are 
generally engaged in more advanced industries why wage is a less important factor. Most of the 
present companies are large which we suggest might be the result of corruption and the strong role 
played by government.  
Keywords: China, Western Development Strategy, Foreign Direct Investment, Localization, Policy, 
Nordic companies 
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1. Introduction 
China’s economy has experienced unusually high growth the past four decades. Few or even no 
comparable examples are present in world history. At the same time as millions of people have been 
lifted out of poverty and enormous wealth has been created, the high growth has also lead to huge 
inequality within the country. While the wealth has increased dramatically in the gigantic cities of 
eastern China the countryside has largely remained unchanged. This development is the result of the 
growth policies adopted ever since the opening up in 1978. However in the past fifteen years several 
initiatives have been taken to direct growth to previously undeveloped areas. The most noticeable of 
these policies is the Western Development Strategy (WDS), a plan for development of the western 
regions of China. The strategy includes several features such as preferential policies and investments 
in infrastructure. Thousands of kilometers of road and railway have been constructed during the last 
decade. The WDS focuses particularly on attracting FDI to the region and to the industrial zones that 
has been created in the larger cities.   
At a first glance, the strategy seems to have paid off. The inward FDI to the Chongqing province has 
grown by 58 percent annually since 2000, compared to 24 percent in Shanghai province (National 
Bureau of Statistics), and it has been a similar development throughout the rest of the western 
region. Is the increased investments the result of government policies or is other factors driving the 
development? Previous research has suggested that factors such as GDP, wage levels, agglomeration 
and infrastructure are important determinants for investment localization. Western China is different 
from the country’s eastern parts in several of these factors. We therefore need to do a more 
comprehensive study before estimating the effect of the Western Development Strategy.   
The move towards western China has been attracting attention also in the Nordic countries. Example 
of this is the Swedish company Volvo Cars which recently opened up a factory in Chengdu. Several 
other Nordic companies have also invested in western China in recent years. What makes these 
companies invest in Chinas hinterland, far away from the business hub of Shanghai and the political 
capital of Beijing? In this paper we will investigate what factors make Nordic companies locate in 
Western China, what role they play in the development of the region and how government policies 
have affected the localization decisions. This is a subject that is not well covered in the literature, but 
have seen an increasing interest in media lately. 
1.1 Aim 
We want to analyze the inbound FDI to Western China, to find out the reasons behind the increase in 
investments in the area and the reasons why Nordic companies invest there instead of elsewhere in 
the country. The question will be addressed through both macro- and microeconomic perspectives.  
1.2 Research Questions  
Through our study we will try to answer the following three research questions: 
1. Which factors are the most important for Nordic companies when investing in Western 
China? 
2. How are the decisions to locate in Western China linked to geography, policies, costs and 
economic growth?  
3. Do policy incentives from the government affect the willingness to invest in Western China?  
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2 Background 
The Chinese Civilization dates back more than four thousand years. During its long history the 
country and the region has experienced times of great wealth and times of misery. Historical heights 
include the Tang dynasty and Ming dynasty, times when China was the leading economic and cultural 
power in the world. However, the last centuries, with colonial oppression under western powers and 
civil war made China weak and the country was outpaced. In October 1949 the People’s Republic of 
China was established. The first decades which followed under communist rule, were strongly 
affected by unsuccessful industrialization programs as well as political instability. The economic 
reforms were introduced in 1978, and since then China has grown to become the second largest 
economy in the world in terms of GDP, surpassing Japan in 2009 (World Bank) . 
Traditionally western China, is made out of six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan 
and Yunnan), three autonomous regions (Ningxia, Tiber and Xinjiang) and one municipality 
(Chongqing). However the Western Development Strategy that we will examine includes two more 
provinces, Guangxi and Inner Mongolia. In order to avoid confusion we will refer to the Western 
Development Strategy area (WDS area) as western China. In figure 1 we see the WDS area in purple.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Economic Regions of China 
2.1 Economic Reforms 
The transition of the Chinese economy has been gradual. To protect domestic industries and 
markets, the opening up towards the rest of the world has been heavily restricted and subject to 
strong political influence. The central and local governments have been the dominating actor in this. 
While opening up some industries for new players, others have been heavily restricted. Rodrik (2006) 
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remarks that the policies used in China resemble those of a country with growth problems rather 
than the other way around. The focus of the policies toward foreign businesses has changed over 
time; in the early days the inflow of capital where much needed, while in later years the focus has 
rather been to adopt technology and management skills from developed nations.  
The first step in Chinas opening up was the establishment of four Special Economic Zones. In these 
zones foreign companies was provided with, Private Property Rights Protection, tax incentives and a 
different land use policy than for domestic investors. Foreign firms were allowed to engage mainly in 
processing trade, which means that components are imported, assembled and then products are 
exported, hence not affecting the local market. This gave producers the benefit of cheap labor. Over 
time more areas where opened up to foreign investors, and gradually the domestic market opened 
up to foreign competition.  
 
As shown in Figure 2 the growth in China has been distinctly higher than for OECD countries, as well 
as for the world as a whole since the reforms started. For example, between 1980 and 1990 the 
growth (inflation-adjusted) was 9.5 percent in comparison with the growth for the world at 3.1 
percent (Wei 1993). Spurred by the initial achievements of the SEZ program the government began 
implementing the system in other parts of China as well.  
Between 1953 and 1978, China had one of the highest average economic growth rates per year in 
the developing world (4 percent), but it was the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaopeng that 
unleashed the potential of China’s economy and made the economy grow with over 10 percent on 
average annually between 1978 and 2011 (Haltmeier 2013). Rawski (1994) acknowledges the 
transition of the Chinese industry and the improved performance to the gradual transition from 
planned economy to market economy. He states that the introduction of SEZs should be seen as a 
step in that direction. The economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping were an attempt to create 
growth in China. Instead of a long term plan, Rawski describes an improvised ad-hoc strategy.  
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2.2 Reforms and inward FDI development 
The development of inward FDI to China can be divided in three phases before the WDS, where the 
first ranges from 1979 to 1983, the second from 1984 to 1991 and the third from 1992 to 1999. As a 
first step after the opening up the Chinese government established four SEZs in the coastal regions 
and the FDI was concentrated to these parts of the country. On average the growth rate of FDI was 
55.4 percent annually during this period. Later on the government decided to open up even more 
parts of the country to the outside world, including Hainan Island and 14 coastal cities. During this 
period inward FDI continued to grow rapidly and growth averaged at 25.4 percent annually. In the 
third step the government decided to open up the majority of China to foreign investments. This 
meant that not only the eastern parts and coastal cities of China were to benefit from enhanced 
trade with the rest of the world. The average growth rate of FDI increased even further as more and 
more parts of the country implemented the policies that primarily came with SEZs (OECD 2000). An 
important event affecting later policies is China’s WTO membership in 2001, since the membership 
strongly have impact on how China treats MNE’s. 
2.3 Previous policies and the lag of the west 
Before 2000 mainly three national Chinese policies, dealing with the coordination of growth across 
China, had an impact on the development in the western regions. From the establishment of the 
Peoples Republic in 1949 we can talk about a Balanced Development Strategy (BDS). It lasted until 
1978 and was aiming to develop all parts of China, and to overcome previous differences in 
development. As a result the Chinese hinterland on average received 58 % of investments in small 
and medium size infrastructure projects between 1953 and 1980 (Lu and Deng 2011). However, the 
view that all of China should develop concurrently changed with the open door policy, this has been 
referred to as the Unbalanced Development Strategy (UDS). The new policy resulted in rapid growth 
in the eastern parts of China, but did not contribute to the development of the west.  
In response to the gap created between west and east, the policies from 1991 until 2000 tried to 
develop other areas apart from the few agglomerations along the coast. This strategy is known as the 
Coordinated Development Strategy (CDS). The strong development of the coastal regions can partly 
be explained by a more preferential policy environment. Foreign and human capital had flowed in 
under the UDS furthering the gap. Under the CDS all of China’s regions were given equal preferential 
policies to enhance the flow of foreign and human capital to other parts of China as well. This did not 
prove to be enough, however. The head start of the east had given them a comparative advantage 
over the other regions, which could not be offset by restoring equality in policy. When the central 
and western parts gradually were opened up they could still not compete with the level of 
infrastructure, technology and human capital, in the east. In some extent the policies was successful, 
and central parts of China started to grow, but large areas in the west remained unaffected by the 
newfound wealth (Lu and Deng 2011). 
There was and still is a growing concern for vast inequalities within the country, and especially the 
gap between the rich city population and the poorer rural population. Before the opening up China 
was poor, but the wealth was evenly distributed. The growth has raised the wealth manifold; 
however, it has not benefited all parts of the population. Figure 3 shows how the Gini-coefficient has 
developed over time, and how the gap between rich and poor has grown. An important explanation 
to the pattern is that there are spatial differences in wealth. As discussed earlier, the coastal regions 
10 
 
have been the key player in the rise of China, while the hinterland has largely remained unchanged. 
Even though the reforms have tried to keep the traditional agricultural sector unaffected.  
 
Figure 3 - Gini index for China, Source: World Bank Data 
In year 2000 the provinces of the Western region represented 70 percent of the land area, 28 
percent of the population but only about 13 percent of the total GDP in China. This was the result of 
past development policies that had promoted growth along the coast. Therefore the central 
government launched the Western Development Strategy in 2000, to promote endogenous growth 
in the west (Lu and Deng 2011). 
2.3 Western Development Strategy  
Like previous programs, the Western Development Strategy (WDS) consists of large public 
infrastructure projects in the region. The program has included the construction of over 210,000 km 
roads and 12,600 km highway, to connect the cities in the west with each other and the rest of China 
(Hongyi 2001). In the same way as was the case when the coastal regions where opened up, policies 
have been adopted to promote private investment. The government for example promotes 
investments in strategically important industries by tax breaks and other benefits.  
Tax deductions are also one of the most prominent policy incentives under the WDFS. In 2007 China 
released a new Corporate Income Tax Law (CIT Law) that applies to both foreign and domestic firms. 
The general tax level was set to be 25 percent (KPMG 2012). The tax law has a special application of 
Corporate Income Tax that applies to western China. The authorities have used a concept of 
Encouraged Industries, which is based on the “Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in 
Industries” (The Catalogue) that is given out by the National Development and Reform Commission 
and the Ministry of Commerce. It lists industries that are Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted and 
Prohibited. This list is also used in other circumstances regarding foreign investment in China. 
Companies in western China can get reduced CIT rate of 15 present if they meet the requirements. 
The business must be listed as an encouraged industry in the Catalogue and derive 70 percent or 
more of its revenue from its main business. These incentives are said to remain valid until the end of 
year 2020. There are also further tax incentives such as the “2+3 tax holiday” that is applicable to 
some investments in western China. The tax holiday gives chosen firms two years exemption from 
CIT and a 50 percent reduction the following three years starting from the first profit making year 
after the investment, for foreign firms. To qualify for this tax holiday companies must be a newly 
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established enterprise engaged in transportation, electric power, water conservation, postal services 
or TV broadcasting in western China and meet certain requirements (KPMG 2012)(Lu and Deng 
2011). 
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
When we analyze capital and movement of capital, the origin of the capital is of interest. In the 
traditional Solow-model the capital stock is generated through investments, which in a closed 
economy comes from savings. In the last decades the national capital markets has grown closer 
together, and this concept is no longer entirely true. The savings of others can finance investments in 
one country; we therefore tend to divide capital dependent on its origin.  
Foreign investors choose different strategies to invest abroad. There is a difference between Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) and portfolio investments. Portfolio investments are a passive investment in 
a security in another country. FDI however is an active investment, where the investor has 
managerial control over the investments. FDI is generally thought of as a subsidiary of a firm (a 
factory or a R&D facility) in another country. Although the concept is quite clear, there are several 
attempts to a more formal definition of the phenomenon. OECD defines FDI as: 
“Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the category of international investment that reflects the objective 
of a resident entity in one economy to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another 
economy.” 
There are even more ambitious attempts to define FDI. In IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5) 
FDI is defined as:  
“A category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident in one economy (the 
direct investor) obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy (the direct 
investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between 
the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence by the 
investor on the management of the enterprise. A direct investment relationship is established when 
the direct investor has acquired 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an 
enterprise abroad.” 
This definition does include the general 10% rule, which is an attempt to set a limit that allows for 
investments to be classified as FDI or not. This is necessary to do in any statistical analysis involving 
FDI. According to this definition a managerial influenced is reached as early as with 10% of the 
capital. This does also mean that several foreign investors can have stakes in the same companies 
without their investments being considered as direct, as long as no one holds a share larger than 
10%.  
In China foreign direct investments consists of three types of enterprises, Equity Joint Venture (EJV), 
Contractually Joint Venture (CJV), and Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises (WOFE). Over time the 
popularity of different types of enterprises has varied, directly after the opening up many investors 
saw an advantage of having a local partner when setting up a business and Joint ventures was more 
common. Today WOFE is by far the most common with over 80% of newly established businesses. 
The second most popular is EJV that in 2012 represented around 18% of new foreign invested 
enterprises (China Statistical Yearbook 2012).  
13 
 
3.1.3 FDI and growth in China 
Looking back on the past decades of growth in China, it is clear that the inflow of FDI has played an 
important role. The government has successfully directed investments in a way that has boosted the 
overall investments at the same time as important management skills as well as technology has been 
transferred to domestic firms. One example of how this works is the car industry. The car industry is 
classified as a restricted industry in the list over encouraged industries. One of the restrictions states 
that FDI in automotive industry only can be achieved through Joint Ventures. In this way Chinese 
companies can learn from foreign companies. 
Studies on FDI in China have found strong evidence for the important role of FDI in the “growth 
miracle”. Poncet and Madariaga (2007) investigate the impact of FDI on Chinese cities and find that a 
7 percent increase in FDI would lead to a 4 percent increase in real income and lead to a 4 percent 
increase in FDI in surrounding municipalities. This is proof of the idea that FDI creates spill-overs to 
the local Chinese economy. Similarly Zhang (2006) used cross sectional data to examine the 
importance of FDI in China’s growth. He identifies significant differences in both growth and FDI 
stock between the costal and the inland regions. Between 1992 and 2004 the coastal regions had a 
growth rate that was 2 to 4 percent higher than that of the inland regions. At the same time the vast 
majority (87 percent) of inward FDI went to the eastern coast. 
 Gilboy (2004) argues that the astonishing growth of China heavily depends on FDI and that the 
country would be worse off without it. This view is being somewhat contradicted by Shang, Poon and 
Yue (2012) as they point out that even if Chinas economic growth might to a large extent have been 
driven by FDI in the past, this has not been the case for the last ten years. They further point out that 
the objective of the Chinese government has changed when it comes to policies and nowadays they 
try to spur the domestic industry and innovation by other means than FDI, such as policy incentives 
and government transfers. An example of this is how the government is working to increase the R&D 
spending to the OECD average of 2.5 percent in 2020, up from 0.6 percent 1996.  
Several strategies have aimed on developing the Chinese hinterland in the last decades and the 
results has varied. The government has put massive amounts in large infrastructure projects but in 
many cases has the results been weak. Shanzi Ke (2010) found that even though big amounts had 
been invested in western China, these have not resulted in endogenous growth. There was also a 
major difference between FDI and domestic capital. FDI investments were much more productive 
than domestic investments.  
3.1.4 Effect of policy incentives on FDI 
FDI has become increasingly interesting for governments around the world in their effort to achieve 
growth. In a more and more globalized world, FDI is widely associated as having many positive 
effects on growth including agglomeration of capital as well as technology and management 
transfers. In the light of this countries have introduce policy incentives in order to attract foreign 
investments. Common policy incentives include so-called tax holiday and direct financial subsidies, 
such as favorable loans (Blomström and Kokko 2003). Besides giving tax holidays to foreign 
companies, the Chinese government is also giving financial subsidies through institutions such as the 
powerful China Development Bank. According to Blomström and Kokko (2003) the difference 
between the two subsidies are that they play dissimilar roles in influencing the investor’s localization 
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decision. The financial subsidy is mostly influencing the decision where to locate, whilst tax holidays 
can affect the company’s operations for a number of years.  
Wren and Jones (2011) state that the result of grants and support to attract FDI are ambiguous. In 
their research they found that grants that were given in order to attract FDI in the United Kingdom 
did indeed increase the probability to locate in the area where they were given the grant. This view is 
shared by (Head, Ries and Swenson 1999) who looked at Japanese investments in USA. They found 
that government support in form of tax deduction, job creation subsidies and offered foreign trade 
zones, saw significant increases in investment overall, but that the effect was partly offset when 
other states introduced the same programs, and thus a geographical pattern of investment could not 
be seen. They also found that a state that had endogenous agglomeration effects would benefit from 
the effects of government support even if other states would introduce the same support.  
3.2 Determinants of localization of FDI 
3.2.1 Localization of FDI 
The localization of FDI is a result of profit maximisation from multinational enterprises. Previous 
studies discuss several aspects of why companies choose to engage in FDI and how they locate their 
investments. In an early work Hymer (1960) discusses the causes that makes foreign companies 
choose to do directed investments instead of other forms of internationalisation such as export or 
licensing. He argues that there must exist a certain firm specific ownership advantage that makes 
international companies engage in FDI; this could include patents, techniques or economics of scale. 
Later works have focused on identifying this owner specific advantage. The OLI-paradigm 
(Ownership, Location and Internalization) also known as the eclectic-paradigm was first presented by 
Dunning (1980) as an attempt to describe the conditions necessary for a MNE to engage in FDI. 
According to Dunning, a profit maximizing company will only engage in FDI when all three conditions 
are satisfied.   
Ownership-, localization- and internalization advantages translate into a number of actual 
circumstances. What is important might be very different between companies. The localization 
advantages is probably not the same between companies producing goods that are meant to be 
exported and companies that are selling to the domestic market. An investor who is going to sell the 
products abroad would most likely want to have cheap and reliable transports, along with low costs 
of the goods or services produced, whereas the investor directing at the domestic market is more 
interested in the demand on the local market. In the last decade the motives behind investments in 
China has changed dramatically and today the main reason is market access (European Chamber of 
Commerce in China 2013). An implication of this could be that the localization advantages today are 
more about the local market rather than access to deep water harbours.  
As there are many different factors that could possibly affect the localization choice of an investor, 
we will in the next sections discuss some of the most important determinants.  
3.2.2 Agglomeration economies 
Agglomeration economies accrue to companies when they benefit from being close to other 
companies in related industries by having productivity gains and getting lower costs of production. 
Through the years much research has been devoted to understand the benefits that agglomeration 
gives. Already in 1920, Marshall suggested that companies could benefit from agglomeration 
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economies if they are located in areas where there is much similar activity. These benefits could be 
access to skilled labour, specialized suppliers and spillovers from other businesses. In more recent 
literature, agglomeration has also been emphasized to be the main factor behind the so-called self-
perpetuating growth, also called the natural growth phenomenon. 
More recent studies have found that agglomeration has a strong impact on the location of FDI.  
Foreign companies who want to invest are likely to seek the benefits that agglomeration economies 
can give them. One of the largest benefits from agglomeration for an investor is the access they get 
to a pool of skilled workers. Alcacér and Chung (2009) argue that commodities and materials in 
general travel longer distances than what workers commute, and thus is much more mobile, giving 
less incentives to locate close to suppliers and more to locate in proximity to where good supply of 
labor is found. They also say that “skilled workers for any given industry will likely be located in only a 
few locations, and labor markets across locations may be less efficient if people hesitate to relocate”.  
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) argue that there is evidence that companies form clusters if they have 
a need for what they call ‘new economic knowledge’. They define this as companies that demand 
highly skilled labour. These companies conduct much R&D and therefore are dependent on 
scientists, laboratories and research universities. This kind of incentive for companies normally is 
positive for already developed areas as they usually already have a supply of the factor that these 
firms demand. This might therefore be a problem for the development of the west, since the 
traditional clusters has been along the coast and it might also explain why the west experienced less 
growth even when the both parts of the country had the same policy environment. 
Krugman (1990) identifies three reasons that by previous research have been established concerning 
agglomeration as a determinant of localization and more specifically on localization of 
manufacturing. The first is that a concentration of firms in one location allows the companies to 
access a pooled market of workers with industry specific skills, something Marshall concluded 
decades before. This secures the company against having labour shortage. Secondly, localized 
companies may help and support input goods, which are non-tradables. Thirdly, spillovers of 
information may enhance the companies’ probability of improving productivity. Krugman also states 
that if holding everything else equal preferred site of localization is the one, which have access to a 
large market and a large demand for products, as transportation costs then are lower.  
Although, most research suggests that firms and investors are attracted to agglomerate, there are 
also contrary views. In a much quoted paper by Myles Shaver and Flyer (2000) findings are put 
forward which shows that firms with the best technologies, human capital, suppliers and so on, will 
not have the incentives to agglomerate as they lose competitiveness in spillovers. The opposite goes 
for companies, which are “weak”, and thus will be more inclined to agglomerate.  
An important part in attracting investments and to achieve endogenous growth in western China is 
to create industry clusters. Cities are creating industry zones targeted on specific industries. A good 
example of the determination to attract investments, is Chongqing’s plan of using 1,5 trillion yuan 
during a three-year period to build up “7 hundred-billion class industrial clusters with total industrial 
output value of over RMB 3 trillion” (Chongqing Municipal Government).  
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3.2.3 Wages 
Arguably, wages will play an important role when deciding where to invest. This is a view shared by 
economists such as Cheng and Kwan (2000), who found in their research that 1 percent higher wage, 
would lead to a half percent decrease in FDI. In another paper Couglin, Terza and Arromdee (1991) 
argue that there is indeed a wage effect on FDI. They also found that higher unemployment rate had 
a positive effect on investment levels, due to better supply of labour. This is probably also correlated 
with wages, as higher unemployment rates mostly leads to a downward pressure on wages and thus 
lower production costs. Couglin and Segev (1999) share this view on wages, and in a paper on China 
they found that wages affects foreign direct investment negatively. Research both from China and 
other areas have shown quite a high effect on FDI overall, leading to the conclusion that wages are 
an important factor in the localization decision. However Ljungwall and Linde-Rahr (2005) does not 
find that labour costs have any significant effect on FDI inflow.  
3.2.4 Taxes 
It is not a radical statement to suggest that tax levels is most likely affecting the localization choices 
of foreign investors. Lesser taxes mean lesser costs and thus more profit for the investor. However, if 
higher taxes would mean for example better infrastructure and higher levels of human capital, it 
might be the opposite.  
Cheng and Kwan (2000) finds that tax is an important factor and so does also Coughlin, Terza and 
Arromdee (1991) in their research on FDI in the US. Tax levels might not be the most important 
factor for all investors and looking too much at taxes might be wrong as some firms (i.e. producing 
for the local market), will be less inclined to care about taxes. Generally higher tax levels are 
deterring FDI, whereas lower tax levels are attracting FDI. In China taxes might thus be a weapon for 
local governments in the fight to bring FDI to their area. 
The magnitude of tax effects on FDI has been debated, most literature on the subject has taken the 
stand that the effect vary largely depending on which type of activity that is being subject to taxation 
and which type of tax (Blonigen 2005). In a study by OECD (2007) that analysed the findings of 
available empirical studies suggests that 1 percent higher tax would lead to a 3.72 percent decrease 
in FDI. 
3.2.5 Human Capital and FDI 
When foreign firms invest abroad, finding labor with the right skills is important. The demand for 
labor is affected by the characteristics of the company’s operations. A high-tech company will require 
more specific skills from their workers compared with a garment producer. Broadman and Sun 
(1997) use adult illiteracy to measure human capital and find that it has a significant effect on inward 
FDI. In China Noorbaksh (2001) finds that that human capital is not only statistically significant 
determinant, it is one of the most important factors and it is becoming an increasingly important 
factor for FDI. 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) uses measures on education level of the population from censuses as a 
proxy for human capital. They find that education as a proxy for the quality labour does not have any 
statistically significant effect on inward FDI. The same result was first found by Cheng and Zhao 
(1995). Ljungwall and Linde-Rahr (2005) use a similar approach in a study on how environmental 
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policies affect FDI. They reach a similar conclusion and cannot find any effect from human capital on 
FDI. These results go against the findings of Noorbaksh (2001).  
3.2.6 Geography and infrastructure 
In China the richest cities are located along the coast, and one of the reasons behind this is that their 
location eases transportation, as transport of goods is easier on sea than over mountains. In most of 
the area that is under Western Development Strategy, there is no presence of sea or waterways in 
the vicinity. To compensate for this shortage will be important if the inland provinces shall succeed 
with their growth strategy.   
Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (2000) states that access to waterways is very important for economic 
growth. This paper was cited by Weil (2013), who also adds that ocean transport as being the 
cheapest way to transport goods, both in 18th century and nowadays. The access to the ocean and to 
the world markets might be one explanation to why western China has lagged behind the coastal 
parts. It might be the case that this offsets other advantages of the west. Looking at the importance 
of infrastructure in China, scholars have used roads and highways as a proxy variable. Some studies 
show a positive effect of infrastructure on FDI in China (Cheng and Kwan 2000, Ljungwall Linde-Rahr 
2005). These results are expected and are in accordance with the OLI paradigm. However Coughlin 
and Segev (1999) do not find any significant effects of highways on FDI inflow in China.  
3.2.7 Special Economic Zones and policy incentives 
China has used Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Economic and Technology Development Zones 
(ETDZ) to attract investments. A study by Luo, Luo, Brennan and Yiang (2008), found that policy 
incentives such as ETDZ (Economic and Technology Development Zones) and industrial 
agglomeration to be the most important factor affecting FDI. They also found that companies tend to 
choose cities with high wages before low wages as it catered for high quality labor, which is a 
contradiction to other literature on the subject. Previous analyses have included a dummy variable 
for the provinces that got the first SEZ. These municipalities have had an astonishing growth even by 
Chinese standards over the past four decades. Cheng and Kwan (2000) find that SEZ has a positive 
effect on FDI inflow, which is in accordance to our expectations.  
Similarly Wei (1993), states that SEZ has been a key component in attracting investments. The author 
adds that a main goal of setting up such zones is to foster so called agglomeration economies in 
these areas, by building clusters and attracting advanced technology facilities. A development of the 
SEZ is the industrial parks that now can be found in all Chinese provinces. Wang (2012) analyses the 
effects the construction of industrial parks have had on local economies. In 2008 there were 295 
municipalities with industrial parks. The result of her research shows that municipalities with such 
industrial parks increased their level of per capita FDI by 21.7 percent alongside a 6.9 percent 
increase in FDI growth rate. This shows that SEZs and the policies that have been implemented in the 
wake of the introduction of such zones have had a strong impact on the local economies in China. 
3.2.8 Cultural and spatial proximity 
Cheng and Zhao (1995) found that spatial proximity to Hong Kong has a strong positive effect on 
inward FDI. Similarly Du, Lu and Tao (2012) examined how cultural proximity affected FDI in China. 
They find a clear pattern of increased investments in areas with historical, cultural and spatial 
proximity. Clear examples of this are Taiwanese investments in Fujian province and investments from 
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Hong Kong in Guangdong province. This kind of proximity does mainly exist between the coastal 
regions and the outside world, why it might be an explanation of the lag of the west. However, this 
correlation is not very clear for investments from the western world, since the relatively difference in 
distances between provinces is very small. 
3.2.9 Government and corruption 
An interest for evaluating government infrastructure and corruption has evolved among scholars, 
companies and policy makers.  Habib and Zurawicki (2002) acknowledge the problems that 
corruption brings when doing business in other countries, which are more corrupt than the home 
country. It creates bottlenecks, brings uncertainty and comes with higher costs. Corruption creates 
distortions in the competition between companies, as some may get more preferential treatment 
than others and access to markets which are profitable. This keeps companies from investing as it 
can become very costly in the end, and as we have concluded before, companies do not like high 
costs. In their analysis the authors also found that corruption had significant negative effect on FDI. 
Wei (2000) similarly found that corruption has clearly negative effect on FDI. At the same time he 
also brings up the example of China as a corrupt country but with large inflows of FDI, along with 
Indonesia. At the same time he found that FDI is negatively affected by taxes, and concludes that 
together with the corruption results. To illustrate the major negative effect that comes from 
corruption he compares Singapore and Mexico. He states that if Singapore’s level of corruption 
would increase to that of Mexico, this would have the same effect on the FDI inflow as a 50 percent 
tax increase. This raises the question on how much FDI China is missing out on due to its high level of 
corruption. 
It is widely argued that, good institutions, fair and stable legislation and governments of high quality 
are preferable if investing and thus improves economic performance. Globerman (2002) established 
that the determinants of good government infrastructure and political governance had a positive 
significant effect on FDI inflow. Especially important for investors was that the government promotes 
competition and open and transparent legal regimes. Benassy-Quere, Coupet and Mayer (2007) 
agree that institutions and quality of government substantially affects FDI inflows, since they found 
that almost all institution-determinants they tested for showed a significant effect on FDI. Especially 
high levels of bureaucracy and corruption have a significant negative effect on foreign investments. 
This leads to the conclusion that the quality of government and institutions, along with the level of 
corruption almost certainly affects the localization decision among the Nordic companies we are 
investigating.  
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4 Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1 The Methodology of the Study 
The study was performed as a field study in China during an internship at the Swedish Embassy in 
Beijing, Office of Science and Innovation. The information was gathered in several ways. A 
quantitative study was done using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). Further 
information on the situation and decisions of Nordic companies active in the Western regions was 
gathered through interviews and a survey. Thirdly interviews were also held with organisations that 
were working with companies that are planning, or have invested in western China. The time period 
for the study was from early April to late June with the interviews mainly executed from late May to 
late June. The internship allowed us to easier get in contact with respondents, which made the 
outcome in terms of number of respondents better, than had been the case otherwise. 
4.2 The Quantitative data 
The data used in the quantitative analysis was obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics, from 
the bureau directly and from their publication, China Statistical Yearbook. All data are on a provincial 
level, making it possible to examine the performance of areas under the Western Development 
Strategy (WDS). The data used is partly presented in the China Statistical Yearbook that is published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics. However, some key indicators where not presented on a 
regional level why the data was bought directly from the ministry.   
4.3 The Qualitative part of the Study 
This part of the study is divided in to three sub-parts; seven semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from companies that has invested in Western China, an online survey that was used 
in two cases where we did not have the possibility to arrange a meeting with the respondent and five 
interviews with organisations, companies and government representatives that works with 
companies that are about to, or already have invested in western China. We sought to have a mix of 
respondents from both investing companies and other organizations working with the former, to 
obtain both detailed answers from the investors themselves and more general opinions from the 
other respondents. 
The interviews were executed during a time period of roughly one month. The aim with the 
interviews was to get a more thorough picture of how and why companies invest in the region and to 
get the information that is not shown in the data. We also wanted to combine the data collection 
with interviews in order to make analysis of the collected data easier. We used the method which is 
called semi-structured interviewing, which means that from a loose structure, in this case our 
questionnaire, you perform an interview and are able to explore different subjects more thoroughly 
as the interview form allow more open questions to be asked. It also has the advantage that we 
could change the order in which you ask questions from time to time and adjust the questions to the 
situation and the person who is interviewed (Ahrne and Svensson 2011). This is in contrast to the so-
called structured interview with standardized questions. The questionnaire we used was originally 
intended to be used as a traditional survey, and did include all the areas that we were examining.  
The interviews were conducted in person in ten cases and over telephone or Skype in two cases. The 
interviews were in three cases recorded and in the other cases we took notes. The recorded 
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interviews have been partly transcribed, so that the transcription includes the relevant parts but not 
nonsense discussions. Similarly the relevant parts of the interviews where we took notes were later 
written out. The questionnaire that we used included a part about corruption. This is a very sensitive 
topic in China, so we will not refer to any of the respondents in this section. During the recorded 
interviews we did also stop the recording during this section. We did this since we believed that the 
fact that we were recording would affect the answers.  
4.5 The selection process 
The selection of whom to interview was made in accordance with the view of Ahrne and Svensson 
(2011), which says that the best way to make a selection is by a two-step process where you first pick 
the organization or company of interest, then pick the individuals within this organization you want 
to interview. What we did was to first make a list of companies who had invested in western China. 
When this list was completed we discussed which to contact. At this time we realized that Swedish 
companies were overrepresented of the roughly 30 Nordic companies which had made investments, 
and thus we would focus on trying to get a proportional amount of companies from each Nordic 
country. We focused on companies with large presence and several offices, as these companies 
clearly prioritized their business in western China. We mainly had contact with the country 
headquarters since they would know more about the company’s strategic decisions, than the local 
offices. 
As a second step we screened persons within the company of interest and these persons were most 
often high-ranking officials. We aimed at those persons to get a good view of why the company 
decided to invest in the region and how they eventually executed it. To get hold of these individuals 
we used as many channels as possible, but mainly through help from persons we met in Beijing, and 
lists available for us by the Swedish Chamber of Commerce and the Embassy of Sweden.  
4.6 Presentation of the interviewed companies 
Our first interview was held with Pierre Mårtensson, China CEO at the direct retail cosmetics 
company Oriflame. The company has been rapidly expanding their presence in western China, as a 
part of their strategy of entering markets early. During the same visit in Shanghai we did also meet 
with three representatives for the packaging company Tetra Pak, who have a packaging material 
factory in Hohhot. We did also hold a phone interview with Robert Gustafsson at Finnair who was 
responsible for the company’s expansion in western China. The Finnish airline was the first 
international airline to start direct intercontinental flights to Chongqing. 
We held a phone interview with Volvo Car’s CEO in China, Lars Danielsson and had the chance to 
meet Christer Wikström, Manufacturing Engineering Director, who gave us a tour of the Chengdu 
factory. In Chengdu we also met with the CEO of a property development concept called “Nordic city 
of living and learning”, Prof. Per Jenster. The development project is located in a northern suburb of 
Chengdu and the complex also host several companies among them the Business Sweden 
representatives office. At AstraZeneca we met with the China CEO David Snow and the vice president 
John Xu. AstraZeneca is present all over China and have several offices in the WDS area, why we 
wanted to interview them. 
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4.7 Presentation of the interviewed government bodies and other actors 
Three interviews were conducted with government agencies involved in foreign investments in 
western China. The Investment Promotion Commission of Chengdu (Invest Chengdu) is a government 
body of Chengdu Municipality Government with the purpose of “arrange investment promoting work 
of key industries, projects and districts”. We met with Yan Huang, Division Executive who introduced 
us to the business climate in Chengdu and what the local government did to attract foreign 
enterprises. The answers from a Chinese government body might not be objective; however we 
wanted to meet with a government organization in order to see if they have a different opinion from 
the companies. 
The opening up of Business Horsens office is a cooperation between Hedensted Erhverv and Business 
Horsens and is a result of that Horsens and Chengdu became friendship cities in 2012. The aim is to 
provide support and help to Danish companies wishing to establish contacts or business in Chengdu. 
Their representative in Chengdu is Jian Li, who apart from representing Business Horsens also works 
with attracting Chinese students to VIA University College and to establish cooperation with local 
universities. The office was opened in the spring of 2013. 
Business Sweden is the result of a merger of the Swedish Trade Council and Invest Sweden, founded 
on January 1, 2013. The organization can be said to be working as consultants, supporting Swedish 
companies when they are operating abroad. In the spring of 2013 they opened its first office in 
western China in Chengdu, where they in June 2013 had one employee stationed. We met with two 
persons from the organization on separate occasions in Beijing and Shanghai, Charlotte Rylme, Area 
manager for China and Swedish Trade Commissioner and Songhong Li, Project Manager. 
Fredrik Ektander is the Chief Representative for SEB in China. We interviewed Fredrik to get 
information on how FDI is financed in China and in western China, and to get his view of what 
attracts companies to the Western region.  
4.9 Discussion of methodology 
Early in the process we examined the possibility of conducting a survey among Nordic companies 
that had invested in western China. Such a study could be customized to fit our research question 
and would bring data which could make the study more unique and interesting. However, several 
factors made us change this strategy. The Nordic companies that have invested in the WDS area are 
few, so few that it would be hard to get quantitative data. This is a problem that also Business 
Sweden encountered when they were conducting a study on the western Chinese market before 
opening their representative office. The small sample is a problem because companies are active in a 
wide range of industries and have very different corporate structure. We also thought the large 
variations between in size as a problem since collected answers would be strongly affected by how 
we defined different business units, and how they were weighted against each other.  
We were also confronted with the problem of getting respondents. Our first step was to make a list 
of all Nordic companies present in the area. This proved somewhat difficult, since no institution has a 
complete list of all present companies. We mainly used information from the Chambers of 
Commerce of the Nordic countries as well as from the different business councils in order to list as 
many companies as possible. In total we identified around 90 business units in western China and 
about 30 companies present. The fact that so few companies where present made us hesitate 
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whether it was realistic to get enough respondents in order to get a statistically interesting data set. 
This in combination with the earlier mentioned problems made us change the strategy towards 
trying to obtain more qualitative data through interviews. This has been an important contribution 
because it has given us a better picture of the reality that companies faces, and how they think of 
localization issues.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the WDS and this is mainly studied in the econometric analysis.  
However as we also wanted to look in to the Nordic conditions we decided to also conduct a micro 
study on a small selection of Nordic companies. This proved to be a good way to put the finding from 
the regression in perspective, and did also help us to get a better understanding for the actual 
condition facing companies that do business in western China. One should not take the answer from 
these few companies as representative for all foreign companies in western China. We do however 
believe that the micro study contributes to the paper by giving the reader a better understanding for 
the circumstances and that that the econometrical study and the micro study benefits from each 
other.  
We had our base in Beijing wich gave us many benefits from being close to the Embassy. However 
this also meant that we were far away from Shanghai and Chengdu which turned out to be the most 
interesting areas for conducting interviews. Most of the larger Nordic companies have their 
headquarters in Shanghai, which can be described as the business capital of China. The only 
interview that was conducted in Beijing was with Fredrik Ektander at SEB.  
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5 Interviews with investors 
The roughly 30 Nordic companies present in western China are found in many different industries 
and the motive behind being present in the area varies largely between companies. It is therefore 
hard to find any clear pattern of companies that invests in the region. Retail companies like IKEA, 
H&M and Oriflame is all targeting the market in western China. Similarly large industry logistics and 
service companies have sales offices in the western region to sell and provide service for their 
corporate customers. Example of this is ABB and Maersk. Some companies have also invested in 
factories in the area, the most prominent examples of this is probably Volvo Cars and Tetra Pak. 
From the list of the companies it is clear that the majority of companies are large, even though a few 
smaller companies have presence. All of the interviewed companies had made so-called greenfield 
investments. 
5.1 Results from interviews with companies 
5.1.1 Market access 
From four of the respondents, Nordic City of Living and Learning, Finnair, Oriflamme and 
AstraZeneca, it was clear that the potential market of western China that was the main driving force 
behind their investments in the region. The reason they explained was that while the market in 
eastern China was full of both domestic and international competitors, the market in western China 
was growing at a fast pace, had fewer competitors and was less mature. At Nordic City of Living they 
referred to a business strategy called ‘Blue Ocean’, published in 2005 in the book ‘Blue Ocean 
Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition Irrelevant’ by authors W. 
Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne. According to the strategy, firms should instead of outperforming in 
current markets, seek and create new markets and therefore make competition less relevant. In the 
Chinese context this means that companies rather focus on the relatively less developed markets in 
the western regions of China where few competitors are active, rather than trying to compete in the 
more developed coastal areas, where strong competition and overcapacity in the industry makes 
profits low. This goes back to the fact that there are great differences within the Chinese markets. A 
company is not only faced with the question whether or not to enter the Chinese market but also 
how and where to enter. The respondent who spoke about Blue Oceans was in the process of 
building a concept city called Nordic City of Living and Learning, in an area outside Chengdu. He 
described it as a market where you could come up with a strong concept, in this case a city with 
Nordic living standards, and have an enormous growth in the business. As the wages in Chengdu 
grew more people could afford a modern apartment. As Nordic City of Living and learning can offer a 
higher standard of living than most competitors sales grow fast.  
Finnair also stated that market motives were behind their decision to open up two new routes to 
western China (to Xi’an and Chongqing). The route to Chongqing was the first to be opened and 
there were two main reasons behind the opening of the route. Firstly they would be the first 
intercontinental airline to establish in Chongqing, avoiding the growing competition on international 
routes to Chengdu. Secondly, they believe in the western Chinese market and that it has high growth 
potential. It would be beneficial to have a strong presence in Chongqing when the importance of the 
city grew. Finnair also stated that they wanted to increase the number flights per week to Beijing and 
Shanghai, but as the cities respective airports have an under capacity today, the decision to look 
elsewhere in China was not far away. The trend in the airline business is to look at second tier cities 
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in China in order to expand business. The market for international flights in western China is growing 
fast, but is still very fragile. If Finnair could establish a strong position on the west Chinese market, 
they mean that they have great prospects to have a large market share in the long run. 
The story of how Oriflame entered China highlights the importance of choosing the right entry 
strategy. The company entered the Chinese market late (2004), and had a hard time to compete with 
the bigger and well-established firms in the first tier cities. They also found it hard to recruit people 
to become private sales representatives for the company. As a result they decided to change 
strategy. The current CEO Pierre Mårtensson describes it as “We choose to listen to what Chairman 
Mao said, first you take the country side and then you go for the big cities”. The company started to 
focus on fourth and fifth tier cities. The new business model quickly paid off and as a result the 
company has grown on average 55 percent in the last three years.  
Astra Zeneca describes how the company is following the development of health infrastructure. The 
development of modern hospitals means new markets for the company, and in recent years this 
development has brought the company to expand in western China. The construction of hospital and 
health infrastructure is something that is largely affected by the development strategies from the 
central government. Many second tier cities sees the development of modern hospitals and 
healthcare as important factors in becoming more attractive to investments and businesses. Astra 
Zeneca is mainly present in the WDS area through sales offices. This development could also be seen 
as benefits from agglomeration since the companies chose to invest close to their customers. 
Similarly one could also say that AstraZeneca is dependent on health infrastructure. However the 
main force behind their decision is the new markets why we say that markets was their main 
objective.  
5.1.2 Agglomeration economies 
Agglomeration economies are probably the most complex determinant of localization to evaluate 
after interviewing the companies and organizations. Tetra Pak described both market potential as 
well as spatial proximity as the most important factors behind their investments in the WDS area. As 
a system supplier for dairy producers, Tetra Pak works with their costumers both before and after 
the costumer have set up its plant. The factory in Hohhot produces packages that are delivered to 
their costumer’s plants. There are thus large benefits of being in proximity to the costumers. The so-
called ‘cow belt’ stretches through northern parts of China and through the provinces of 
Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang and is the dairy center in China. There is an obvious reason 
for producing the dairy product close to the source of the raw milk.  After the production it is 
possible to ship the products to areas where there is a stronger market for dairy products such as the 
richer southern and eastern parts of the country. This was the most important reason for locating in 
Hohhot, although other factors might have had a somewhat positive effect on the decision.  
Volvo Cars decision to locate in Chengdu was not entirely motivated by benefits from agglomeration 
economies, but through the whole process it has been a prominent feature. The land on where the 
new factory has been built was dedicated to Geely, Volvo’s owner, at first, but was later assigned to 
Volvo for an undisclosed, but low cost. The factory is situated in Chengdu Economic and 
Technological Development Zone where several large vehicle makers are present. The zone is named 
as a ”…hotspot in the Great Western Development of China, enjoys broad development prospect” on 
Invest Chengdu’s official website (Invest Chengdu). Apart from Geely, whose factory is neighboring 
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Volvo’s, companies like Faw-Toyota, Faw-Volkswagen, Sinotruk Wangpai and other prominent 
vehicle makers have factories and plants in the area. Already in 2008 there were 16 whole-vehicle 
manufacturing and assembling companies along with 139 parts manufacturers present in the city of 
Chengdu (European Business Network), a number which most likely will have grown substantially 
since then. These companies have effectively created an automobile cluster in the city. According to 
the theory of agglomeration economies, companies who come to a cluster where competitors 
already have established, have an advantage as they can attract already educated personnel from its 
competitors. An anecdote from Christer Wikström at the Volvo Cars factory in Chengdu, tells that 
when they were employing people at an event downtown Chengdu, whole work teams from Faw-
Toyota came to the event as they saw Volvo as an attractive employer. This shows the benefits to 
enter a cluster if you are an attractive company. Volvo along with Sweden overall have a very good 
reputation in China, or as one of the representatives at Tetra Pak put it “Sweden is what China wants 
to become one day. A lead example of a middle road between richness and modesty”.  
Locating in a cluster has several other advantages. The transport network is already in place, which 
eases the transport of the cars being produced. A network of suppliers has also been built up, 
enabling access to material and components. But in the case of Volvo, there is also synergy effects 
with being so close to Geely, its owner. For Volvo as they get access to Geely’s network, and for 
Geely as they get access to Volvo’s technology.  
Finnair, on the opposite, said that it had both advantages and disadvantages starting up a business 
where few others had being investing before. The advantage was that they could pick the ‘best’ 
employees first, but the disadvantage was still that it was so few people that were interesting to 
recruit. The supply of people with ‘right’ education and experience from working in an international 
company was low, which complicated the task of finding ‘right’ labor a lot.  
5.1.3 Infrastructure 
None of the respondent was referring to infrastructure (in terms of roads, railroads and waterways) 
as the most important factor to their establishment in western China, but it was a general concern 
when locating to the region. At Volvo Cars they described the infrastructure as good, which was a 
condition for investing, but this was not something that made Chengdu unique. This is the general 
picture that we got from companies, that infrastructure was a basic condition for investing in a 
location. However, when a certain standard was ensured, better infrastructure did not affect the 
investments anymore. All of the interviewed companies stated that their investments in western 
China was a part of their expansion on the Chinese market, in contrast to companies making export 
focused investments. It is possible that companies that are export oriented require a higher level of 
infrastructure, waterways not the least. Maybe the lack of access to waterways indicates why the 
presence of such companies seem to be low. 
Invest Chengdu stressed the importance of providing good infrastructure for foreign investors, and 
among major investments that have been made the last decade is the special cargo railway that 
connects Chengdu and the Polish city of Lodz that was opened in April, 2013. Transporting goods to 
Europe will take 15 days, and they hope that this will serve as a major attraction for manufacturing 
companies. A new airport is also planned to be in service by 2018 and serve approximately 80 million 
passengers a year, the same as the capacity of Beijing Capital International Airport. 
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Oriflame talked about the infrastructure from a network marketing perspective. Oriflame has 
outsourced all logistics services to Alibaba, the major Chinese online retail company. The reason 
behind this decision was the lack of countrywide services; previously they had several contractors 
across the country. The access to the Alibaba network means that the company can reach more 
costumers and only have one logistics supplier. This shift has been a good move for Oriflame, and 
they stated that range of the logistics system is impressive, even though the company’s strategy of 
entering early sometimes pushes the system to the edge. When entering the market of Chinas far 
north, the company needed to uses special heated railway carriages in order for the products not to 
freeze during the transport. It was crucial that the products did not get damaged, not only for the 
customers and sales representatives, but to avoid drawing attention from the authorities. Problems 
with quality could lead to problems with obtaining licenses and such in the future.  
In the case of Finnair the infrastructure in terms of air transports was described as very good. Robert 
Gustavsson described it as, “The volumes on domestic flights are growing to become one of the 
highest in the world, but international flights are not there yet”. The network from and to the airport 
in Chongqing was really good and helped Finnair to connect their own flights with a lot of domestic 
flights, easing the sales of tickets. For a network airline like Finnair, good flight connections to other 
airports in China are very important.  
Telecommunication and internet is an important function in the daily operations of most companies. 
There are contradictory views on how well it works though. Both Tetra Pak and Oriflame state that 
they it works fairly well, while Finnair think it works worse than is acceptable. They therefore let the 
Internet connection go through their system in Finland to assure good access.  
5.1.4 Taxes 
One of the most important findings of the interviews with the different companies is the complexity 
of taxes. In the review before the construction of the survey and before conducting any interviews 
we found two general tax cuts that were applicable to companies making FDI in western China. Our 
hypothesis was that this would have a strong effect on companies, making investments more 
attractive, as suggested in the literature. However when we talked to companies, we found that the 
situation was much more complex. The tax rebate was only one of several factors that could be 
classified as government support policies. Furthermore the actual tax level that companies face is set 
on an individual basis after negotiations with the local tax office. This meant that there is no certainty 
that an investment in the western provinces results in lower taxes than what is the case in the east. 
Sometimes even districts within a city compete with each other by offering better tax deals than the 
other, in order to get a company to locate in their district.  
SEB described how the list of encouraged industries, which determines if a company, can get the 
preferential tax policies or not, is hard to apply why sometimes the first item of negotiation is 
whether or not investment is an encouraged industry. Furthermore the local government has lots of 
power in the process and its own interests; this might create conflicting interests between different 
levels of government. At Nordic City of Living and Learning we were told that the governments 
higher up sometimes is pushing local governments to accept investments that for the local 
government most certainly will mean a large cost. We were given an example of a city government 
pushing a city district government to give good conditions to a large factory that will benefit the city 
as a whole. That every decision is up for negotiation is good for some companies but bad for others. 
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A factory that employs a large proportion of the inhabitants of a city has a good position when 
negotiating for a new tax agreement. However, a smaller firm might not get the same benefits.  
5.1.5 Government and Institutions 
There are also several other ways in which companies can be supported in order to promote 
investments. In the case with Volvo Cars the main reason for the establishment was that their owner 
Geely already had a factory in Chengdu, which helped them to get cheap land and quickly start the 
construction of the factory. The local government can also make it easier for companies to access 
credit from banks and can help give companies cheaper credit. As an investor you will need to see 
the bigger picture of the support you are getting from the government. In Volvo’s case the fact that 
they quickly could start building the factory in combination with the advantages that the automotive 
cluster offered where convincing. At the same time you are not free to set up a factory wherever you 
want, and setting up a car factory in an area that the government has a different strategy for might 
cause problems. So when the current location gained support from the different government bodies 
in combination with satisfying infrastructure, an already present owner and cluster advantages, the 
Chengdu location came out as the best alternative. So far Volvo is satisfied with the location, and 
sees an even better situation in the future as more and more suppliers locate in the area.  
For all companies present in China government relations are very important, the same is the case in 
western China. All of our responding companies mentioned government relations as an important 
factor in succeeding in western China. Nordic City of Living and Learning described the Chengdu 
government as very progressive and business oriented. Volvo Cars, also shared this view, and 
described the local government as helpful, and willing to get the company to locate in the city. 
However, several of the respondents are describing it as much easier to get permits and get help 
from the government if you are a ‘large’ company. The main reason behind this is that ‘large’ 
companies are creating more jobs, increase demand in the local economy and create higher tax 
revenues. In many cases city governments of western China are much focused on attracting FDI and 
therefore they are very helpful towards foreign companies. However, to firms investing in China with 
their origin in more liberal countries, the process still means many permits from several government 
bodies. The general picture from the interviews is that the governments of western China are as easy 
to do business with as those in other cities in China.  
Invest Chengdu emphasized that the government of Chengdu are working hard to create a good 
business climate in the city. One example that was told to us was that Chengdu became a National 
Pilot city for Copyright Protection in 2008 and became the first National Pilot city for IPR in 2007. The 
government has also tried to ease the application process for starting a new business by putting 
several of the government functions you need permits from in the same location in what they call 
the Governmental Service Center. Instead of needing to visit all involved agencies the investor only 
needs to visit the service center, which speeds up the process considerably. 
5.1.6 Corruption 
In general the level of corruption in western China is not considered worse than in other parts of 
China. It is a problem when doing business in China overall, however. As good government contacts 
are crucial to getting permits and access to markets, it is commonly believed that corruption in some 
way exists in all industries. All our respondents were very clear with that they were avoiding getting 
involved in any form of corruption. Overall, this is a sensitive subject and it is quite hard to evaluate 
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the results in this part due to this. However, they were convinced that it existed and that competitors 
were engaging in corruption of some kind. Therefore they considered corruption to be a problem as 
they might lose revenue and end up with higher costs.  
The largest source of corruption is not always directly linked to the government, however. A 
common form of corruption is the so-called kickbacks. Kickbacks refer to when employees makes 
personal profit, usually in the form of a percentage of the deal a company makes. Kickbacks exist on 
all levels in organizations and are seen as a big problem. An example of a kickback could be a 
purchasing director asking for a certain amount in order to accept an offer from a supplier. Another 
example of this kind of corruption is when an employee who is making a standard purchase for the 
company asks a shop owner to raise the price, and then share the difference between the original 
price and the new higher price. This raise the expenditures for the company as well as it are costly to 
prevent such actions from taking place.   
5.1.7 Wages 
From the responses in our interviews and from the online forms the general picture is that there are 
lower wages in western China. This conforms to the general statistics of the wages across China. 
However, the picture from the responses is somewhat more diversified. The wages for unqualified 
labor is generally lower; Finnair estimated them to be 50 - 70 percent lower in western China 
compared to eastern China. The majority of respondents estimate the wages to be around 70 
percent of the levels along the cost. As a result of lack of local labor with specific knowledge and 
relevant experience, companies were sometimes forced to recruit personnel on a national level, 
mainly from more developed areas in the east. This caused the wages to increase for theses group of 
employees. This was the case when both Tetrapak and Volvo set up their factories in western China. 
One of the reasons for the lower wages in the west is the lower living costs, according to Invest 
Chengdu. The respondent goes as far to say that Chengdu has a comparative advantage to Beijing 
and Shanghai, as the living costs are so much lower. This effects on all levels and is a major reason to 
why employees are seeking to work in the west. It can also be noted that in Chengdu whose 
universities educate many in the field of Information Technology are said to not experience a severe 
‘brain drain’ to the cities in Eastern China. 
Volvo saw the lower wages as a benefit of being in western China, but they also said that the 
investment in a factory is very long term. Since the wages in the west in the long run are expected to 
increase, it would not be smart to build a car factory only because of cheaper labor. Christer 
Wikström at the Chengdu factory thought that the lower wages affected the design of the factory to 
become less automated and more labor intensive. He also said that only during his time at the 
factory in Chengdu, the wages had increased sharply. This in itself is a problem as the turnover is 
large. Several of the respondents however, saw it as much harder to attract the ‘best’ people in 
Shanghai and Beijing, and expressed it, as the labor turnover was much worse in those cities. Some 
respondents said that while they had to pay really large amounts for the ‘best’ management in the 
bigger cities, they had to pay large amounts in western China because of the low supply of good 
management people. 
Lower wages might for some companies be the most important reason behind locating to the WDS 
area. SEB is describing how companies are locating call centers and IT support functions in western 
China. One example off this is the telecom company Ericsson that has invested in a global service 
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center in Xian (Ericsson). According to SEB these companies are choosing these locations because the 
salaries are low compared to the coastal areas. At the same time the operations are less dependent 
on spatial proximity, as long as the IT infrastructure is sufficient a costumer will not notice if the 
support function is located in the same city or on the other side of the globe.  
5.1.8 Human Capital 
Access to qualified labor is varying across western China. While cities like Chengdu, Chongqing and 
Xi’an have large universities that increase the access to skilled labor, the situation might be worse in 
smaller cities. The previously mentioned trend with IT support and call centers being located shows 
that the area can offer educated labor. However, both of the respondents that had invested in 
factories in the areas expressed a problem finding experienced personnel in areas such as 
management and production engineering. In order to resolve this, both companies had to turn to 
other areas in China to recruit personal, which forced them to pay higher wages. 
Opposite to what one might think Oriflame finds that it is often harder to recruit relevant people in 
Shanghai compared to western China. In less developed areas a foreign employers is more attractive 
to talents, which makes the recruitment easier. There are also less companies competing for talents, 
which means that it might be easier for companies to recruit and keep talents in the WDS area. In the 
case of Oriflame they find the loyalty to be higher among educated people in western China 
compared to other areas. For uneducated labor the situation is the opposite.  
5.2 Results from interviews with organizations 
5.2.1 Business Sweden 
Business Sweden has recently opened their first representative office in western China. This was the 
result of a long period of increased interest from Swedish companies towards the western provinces. 
Before the establishment a survey of the situation in the western regions was conducted and among 
international firms with presence in the area.  In the report Business Sweden found the main reason 
for investing in western China is to exploit the local market, this can be seen in figure 4. The location 
was most often chosen after their own study on appropriate locations for investing. However, the 
survey conducted was only answered by 11 out of the 45 contacted companies, so the results can 
hardly be seen as statistically significant, but it can give some indication for the general situation in 
the area.  
Figure 4 – Reason for investment, Source: European Chamber of Commerce 
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Reason for investment
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Business Sweden chose to locate in Chengdu. This was the first step for Business Sweden in entering 
the western Chinese market. So far the office does only have one local employee, but the interest 
from Swedish companies has turned out to be big according to Business Sweden. They state that the 
interest for western China is increasing quickly and that it is possible that the operations will be 
expanded in order to be able to provide more services.  
5.2.2 Invest Chengdu 
Invest Chengdu has representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, where the Shenzhen 
office also covers Hong Kong. Invest Chengdu tries to identify which companies that might be 
considering making an investment and then help them by showing the possibilities that Chengdu can 
offer depending on what is relevant for the individual companies. In this process they discuss what 
support and preferential policies they can get from the government, but also what the government 
might require in return. As we have presented above Chengdu is working very actively to attract 
investments. The majority of companies that is considering investing in Chengdu have already 
invested in eastern China. It is easier for companies that have already experience from China to do a 
new investment.  
5.2.3 Business Horsens / VIA University  
There is indeed an interest in the region from Danish companies, but there is a long way from being 
interested to actually take the step of engaging in the local market. Up to now the interest has been 
quite low. Most companies that show interest for the Chengdu market have a strong niche, such as 
environmental technology or medical equipment. However this is generally small companies even by 
Danish standards and become even smaller in a Chinese context. If you are a small company you 
have a hard time to get noticed both by governments and the market itself. It is also very difficult for 
a small firm to deal with the authorities, as it is much harder to get around all the bureaucracy and 
processes with permits compared with larger firms. Despite this hard struggle he said that the 
response from the Chengdu government of opening up the office had been really good and they 
were really eager to attract Danish companies. 
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6 The Data 
The data used in the empirical analyses is a panel data set for 31 provinces over the period 1997 – 
2011. The data includes the four city municipalities Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing as well 
as the autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Gunagxi. Previous 
research has not included Tibet autonomous region due to lack of data, but the data availability has 
become much better in later years so we have chosen to include it in the analyses. We choose to 
start our time series in 1997, since it is the first year with data for both Chongqing and Sichuan as 
separate provinces; before 1997 Chongqing was a part of Sichuan. Due to the fact that the cities of 
Chengdu (Sichuan) and Chongqing are the most developed cities in the WDS area we believed that 
the alternative to leave out the provinces in order to get a longer time series would affect the result 
negatively. The data has been obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics and been 
complemented with data presented in China statistical yearbooks 1998-2012.  
Table 1 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Increase in total investment, index year 1997       
North China 100 103.4 116.1 148.3 194.3 279.9 331.8 397.3 
North East China 100 108.7 145.7 182.9 207.3 283.1 309.6 384.8 
East China 100 101.6 121.2 178.1 262.5 359.8 420.4 525.7 
South China 100 99.0 99.1 105.1 130.3 190.3 211.4 218.3 
WDS area 100 105.9 112.4 136.5 185.7 273.8 377.0 479.6 
         
Increase in total investment, index year 2000     
North China   105.0 121.0 159.6 235.9 284.1 354.5 
North East China   97.5 122.5 138.8 189.6 207.4 257.7 
East China   114.5 168.3 248.0 339.9 397.2 496.7 
South China   99.6 105.6 130.9 191.1 212.4 219.3 
WDS area     104.7 127.1 172.9 254.7 350.9 446.5 
         
Increase in total investment, index year 2005     
North China     100 147.8 178.0 222.2 
North East China     100 136.6 149.4 185.7 
East China     100 137.1 160.2 200.3 
South China     100 146.0 162.2 167.5 
WDS area         100 147.3 203.0 258.2 
 
Our dependent variable, annual FDI is defined as investment by foreign funded enterprises, including 
joint-venture, cooperative, sole (exclusive) investment industrial enterprises and limited liability 
corporations with foreign funds. All provinces have positive levels of FDI inflow during the entire 
period, and there is a clear trend of increased investments over the period. In table 1 you can see the 
development of inward FDI over the studied period; we find that the invested amount has increased 
almost fivefold in the WDS region from 1997 until today. The development has only been stronger in 
east China over the period. If we look at the annual growth in total investments which can be found 
in figure 5 we can see that the increase in eastern China was particularly strong under the first half of 
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the 00’s. Correspondently if we look at the development of FDI in the second half of the same 
decade, which can be found in table 1, we see that the strongest increase has accrued in the WDS 
area. In Figure 5 we can also see that the growth in FDI in the WDS area surpassed eastern China in 
2005 and that the increase in the area has been the highest for any area in China after 2008. Since 
the global financial crisis in 2008 the increase of FDI has slowed in all provinces, but in recent years 
the trend has stabilized.  
 
Figure 5 Annual increase of investments Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
The share of total FDI that goes to the WDS area is still very small, but has increased over the period, 
which can be seen in figure 6. The share of FDI to eastern China has increased dramatically and has 
for the second half of the period constituted 50% of all inward FDI to China. The WDS are has in 
recent years passed North East China but does still attract less than 10% of total FDI.  
 
Figure 6 Share of total FDI to geographic areas as percentage of total: National Bureau of Statistics 
The Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita is used as an estimator on the size of local markets. GRP 
is expected to have a positive impact on FDI inflow, since a high value would imply large potential 
markets. We use a per capita measure of GRP in order to be able to compare different provinces. We 
consider the risk for multicollinearity between GRP and FDI to be low. For the entire country FDI as a 
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percentage of total GDP has been below 4% in recent years. The per capita gross regional product 
(GRP) has increased significantly for all regions in China over the period. The WDS area was and still is 
the poorest region in China at the end of the period. In real terms the differences between the states 
has increased over the period. There has been no change in the rank in per capita GRP between 
regions over the period, but the relative difference has declined some. In 1997 northern China, the 
richest area in China had a GRP 2.5 times as high compared with the WDS area. In 2012 the same 
number was 1.9. Similarly if we only look at the increase over the period we find that the WDS area 
had the highest increase in GRP. This development has been particularly strong over the last five 
years, and match well in time with the biggest increase of FDI inflow to the region.  
 
Figure 7 Increase of GRP with index year 1997 Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
We control for the difference in human capital by using the fraction of the population with a Senior 
Secondary/Secondary Technical School education. The measure was not available on an annual basis 
but was presented as the result from the fifth and sixth national censuses in 2000 and 2010 
respectively. We used the values to construct a linear progression over the period. Since the 
proportion of the total population with a certain degree of education is changing gradually we expect 
the linear progression to be close to the real values. This had not been possible for a variable that 
show bigger movement year-on-year like GDP. A similar approach is used by Cheng and Kwan (2001).  
Over the period we see a large increase for all provinces. As is expected the highest values is found in 
the city municipalities Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, while the lowest values are found in Tibet, 
Guizhou and Yunnan, all in the WDS area. 
We expect that lower wage costs will have a positive effect on inward FDI. We use data from the 
China Statistical Yearbook on average wage of staff and workers in yuan. The data is not presented 
under the same name for all yearbooks but was compiled by comparing time series. We control for 
the level of agglomeration in provinces by the agglomeration variable that measures the proportion 
of population living in cities. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on FDI as urbanization 
is associated with several aspects of agglomeration benefits. The data was missing for 1997-2000 and 
from 2002-2003. To resolve this we used linear regression based on the values of 2001 and 2004 to 
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estimate values. Similarly as with the education variable this measure changes gradually why we 
expect the estimated values to be close to the real proportion. 
We experiment with two different measures for infrastructure. We use a similar approach as Cheng 
and Kwan (2000) and Ljungwall Linde-Rahr (2005) when we look at the length of highways and 
railways separately and divide the length with the area of the province to make the data comparable 
between provinces. We expect that longer transportation routes adjusted for province area should 
have a positive effect on FDI inflows. We choose to look at two different measures, since we wanted 
to see if there was any difference in the results.  
Previous research has found that the provinces where the first special economic zones were 
established have a higher level of FDI. To take this in to account we include the SEZ variable which is 
a dummy variable for the two provinces of Guangdong, and Fujian. Thus we expect a positive sign for 
this variable. It has also been found that cultural proximity is an important factor determining 
localization of FDI, especially for FDI from neighboring countries. However we do not include a 
variable for this since the most prominent example of provinces with strong cultural ties with 
neighboring countries are the same provinces that first opened economic zones. Instead we expect 
this effect to be captured by the SEZ variable. 
We use a dummy variable to examine the effect of the Western Development Strategy. The dummy 
variable measures the effect that is specific to the WDS after a certain point in time. We use two 
points in time to analyze the effects of WDS on FDI and how this has changed over time. The policy 
was launched in 2000 and therefore we look at the effect in the area after the initiation (WDS 2000). 
However, it is likely that the policy did not get implemented directly and that there is a certain lag of 
the inflow of investments. We therefore introduce a second variable that measures the effect in the 
area starting five years after the policy was launched (WDS2005). If the policy has had any effect on 
the inflow to the WDS area we expect a positive and significant result.  
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7 The model 
In table 2 you can find a short description on used variables. Descriptive statics for the variables can 
be found in Appendix 1.  
Table 2 
1. FDI Investments by Foreign funded enterprises in 100 million USD; 
Foreign Funded Enterprises refers to all industrial enterprises 
registered as joint-venture, cooperative, sole (exclusive) investment 
industrial enterprises and limited liability corporations with foreign 
funds 
2. GRP per capita (GRP) Gross Regional Product (100 million yuan) at current prices 
3. Education (HC) Proportion of population with a Senior Secondary/Secondary 
Technical School education. We used the observations from the fifth 
(2000) and the sixth (2010) national census to construct a linear 
regression for the period 
4. Wage (LC) Average wage of staff and workers in yuan 
5. Agglomeration (AGG) Proportion of population living in cities 
6. Highways (TR) Length of highways and expressways (km) / province area (km²) 
7. Railways (TR) Length of railways (km) / province area (km²) 
8. SEZ Dummy variable for the provinces (Guangdong and Fujian) that first 
was allocated special economic zones 
9. WDS2000 (WDS) Dummy variable for the WDS area after year 2000 
10. WDS2005 (WDS) Dummy variable for the WDS area after year 2005 
In the regressions we have used two different models. The first is the basic Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model and the second is the fixed effects model (FE). The FE model is an OLS model that 
includes dummy variables for every group or subject in the data set. This is done in order to create 
individual intercepts for the groups or subjects. In this case we have data for 31 provinces. The 
intercept will most likely differ between this groups, as all else equal; the FDI level will be lower 
respectively higher in some provinces than in others. This is most likely the cause of a lot of factors, 
that we have not taken account for in our regressions. That is why we end up with different results in 
the OLS regressions and the fixed effects regression. Why we present both of them in the analysis is 
to emphasize the fact that the provinces have different starting levels of FDI. 
When doing panel data we can choose between two models. Besides the fixed effects (FE) model we 
can also use the random effects (RE) model. The difference between the two of them is that while 
the FE model measures the differences in intercepts across groups, the RE model investigates 
differences in error variances. To choose which model to use, we ran the Hausman test. This tests 
the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients in the two models is not systematic. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the estimators created by the RE model is biased, thus the FE model will be 
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better to use. The result of the test is found in Appendix 1. The test could not be completed for 
numerical reasons since the test assumes that the standard errors in the FE model are larger than in 
the RE model, but in our test three of them were not. As the FE model is considered more of a safe 
choice, we therefore choose to use that one. 
What we have described up to now is a one-way FE model, which takes into account the different 
intercepts between groups. In our data we also have a time variable. Thus we have to correct for if 
there is a time effect on our results as well. To do this we create dummies with 1997 as the base 
year. When we have completed these two steps and run our regressions, we have corrected for both 
differences between time and regions and we have now used a two-way FE model. Below you can 
see the function of the used model. 
log⁡(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑆𝐸𝑍 + 𝛿2𝑊𝐷𝑆2000𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿3𝑊𝐷𝑆2005𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
In our regressions time is not the interesting part as we focus on the differences between the 
provinces. We therefore include dummy variables for time in both regressions, in order to enlighten 
the differences in the estimators. 
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8 Results 
The result from the regression analysis is presented in tables 3 and 4. In order to examine how 
different analysis methods affect our result we present the results from both an OLS regression as 
well as a fixed effect regression. As is described in the previous section the FE regressions are 
different from the OLS regressions, since it captures characteristics that is correlated to individual 
provinces. Both regressions include time dummies why the time trend will not affect the results.  
8.1 OLS regression 
In all regressions the education variable is insignificant. It does carry the expected sign and is close to 
significant in the fourth equation. The GRP has the expected sign and is strongly significant in all 
equations. The effect of GRP is both statistically and economically significant; an increase of 10000 in 
per capita GRP leads to an increase of investments by around 60 percent. Agglomeration also carries 
the expected sign and is significant or strongly significant for all regressions. The effect is very strong, 
an increase of the urban population with 10 percentage points leads to an increase of investments by 
around 20 percent.  
Table 3 - OLS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.4649 4.4649 3.8028 3.6958 3.4284 3.3566 
 (.2251) (.2464) (.2350) (.2729) (.2044) (.2017) 
Education   2.0517 4.6703 0.6383 0.6771 
   (2.3842) (2.8570 (2.0255) (2.0198) 
GRP*   0.7360***  1.1590*** 0.5640*** 0.6050*** 
   (.1030) (.1110) (.0089) (.0089) 
Agglomeration   0.0079** 0.01420*** 0.0199*** 0.0213*** 
   (.0038) (.0045) (.0034) (.0034) 
Highways   2.2986***  2.0910*** 2.3547*** 
   (.2034)  (.1890) (.1873) 
Railways    -2.6078   
    (5.6709)   
Wages**   -0.1143*** -0.1174*** -0.0988*** -0.1090*** 
   (.0121) (.0140) (.0107) (.0107)  
WDS2000 -2.1776***    -0.1831  
 (.1394)    (.1224)  
WDS2005  -2.1758***    0.2896** 
  (.1912)    (.1436) 
SEZ     2.0758*** 2.1625*** 
     (.1644) (.1618) 
R² 0,42 0,30 0,67 0,57 0,76 0,76 
**In 10000 yuan * In 1000 yuan 
We try with two different variables for infrastructure, railroads and highways, and find highways to 
be both significant and have the expected sign, while railroads have neither. We therefore choose to 
continue with the highway variable as a proxy for infrastructure. The highway variable indicates a 
strong effect of infrastructure on FDI. To illustrate the effect from infrastructure, a 10 percent 
increase of the average ratio 0.43 (appendix 1) will result in an increase of total investments by 
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around 10 percent. Wages has a strong effect and is significant in all regressions. A 1000 dollar 
increase in wages will lead to a decrease in FDI by around 10 percent in all regressions.  
We do not find the expected result of the policy dummy variable. The 2005 variable is significant in 
both regressions while the 2000 variable only is significant in the first regression. The 2005 variable is 
significant in both regression but have different signs which might imply some problem with the 
model or the variable. It is likely that the strong negative effect of the dummy is linked to the fact 
that the WDS area has had lower levels FDI throughout the period. The SEZ variable is strongly 
significant in both regressions and implies that provinces that were granted with special economic 
zones first have twice the FDI of other regions. As we add variables the R² increases and in the last 
equation over three quarters of the variation can be explained through the model.  
8.2 Fixed effect regression 
Similar to the OLS we do not find any relevance of the education variable in any regression with the 
fixed effects estimators. GRP is strongly significant in all regressions and has a positive effect of 
between 10 and 15 percent for an increase of 10000 yuan in per capita GRP. This must be said to be 
economically significant and is according to our expectations. We do not find that agglomeration has 
any explanatory significance of the FDI inflow. This is different from the results in the OLS regression 
and suggests that what was suspected to be agglomeration rather was due to differences between 
provinces. 
Table 3 – Fixed Effects 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.4649  4.4649 4.5718 4.5466 4.5440 4.559408 
 (.0576) (.0576) (.3228) (.3112) (.3220) (.3216) 
Education   -1.6642 0.1983 -0.5131 -0.5005 
   (3.2132) (3.1981) (3.2567) (3.2487) 
GRP*   0.1180** 0.1260*** 0.1340***  0.1420*** 
   (.0046)  (.0045) (.0046) (.0047) 
Agglomeration   0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0026 
   (.0081) (.0081) (.0082) (.0082) 
Highways   0.0600  0.1088 0.1552 
   (.1310)   (.1329) (.1382) 
Railways    -7.9712   
    (7.8347)   
Wages**   -0.0129* -0.0098  -0.0146** -0.0154** 
   (.0072) (.0074) (.0072) (.0073)  
WDS2000 0.0554    0.1500*  
 (.0690)    (.0771)  
WDS2005  0.0310    0.1557** 
  (.0612)    (.0748) 
SEZ     omitted omitted 
      - - 
R² 0,08 0,09 0,15 0,11 0,14 0,17 
**In 10000 yuan * In 1000 yuan 
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Similar to the OLS regression we try two different infrastructure variables. None of them show any 
significance but the highway variable shows a better performance with a positive sign why we 
choose to include it in the later equations. The wage variable have a negative effect in all regressions 
and is significant in the third, fifth and sixth equation. This result conforms to the expected effect. 
The result is also economically significant as a 1000 yuan increase of average wages will lead to a 1.5 
percent decrease of FDI to the region. The SEZ is omitted due to collinearity with the province 
dummies.  
We find a significant effect of the policy dummy for Western Development strategy. The result is 
significant on the 10 percent level for the 2000 dummy and on a 5 percent level for the 2005 dummy. 
The result is positive which suggest that the WDS strategy has had a positive effect on FDI levels. The 
effect is more positive and more significant in later years. The result suggest that the provinces under 
the Western Development Strategy has had a 16 percent higher increase of investments after 2005 
compared with other provinces, which is a relatively large effect. This result is different from the 
results in the OLS regressions. This is probably because we include individual intercepts.  
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9 Analysis of the results 
9.1 Wages 
Wages in China have increased manifold between 1997 and 2011. In the literature there is strong 
evidence that wages affect FDI negatively. The result from our regressions suggests that wages have 
a negative effect on FDI inflow to a province. This conforms to the theoretical framework which 
means that investors will prefer to invest in areas where they will pay lower salaries, everything else 
equal. At the average wage level in China of around 20000 yuan (appendix 1) a 5 percent increase of 
wage will result in a 1.5 percent decrease in FDI inflow. According to our findings a region whose 
wages are rising fast in absolute values, but low in percentage terms would see a larger decrease in 
investments compared with a region whose wages are increasing fast in percentage terms but not in 
absolute terms. An example of this could be Yunnan that starts off from a very much lower level than 
Beijing. This might imply that provinces in the WDS area will have a comparative advantage in wages 
for some time ahead. These findings, however, might also be the result of the specifications of the 
model. 
The result from the data analysis is also consistent with the answers in the interviews. Most 
respondents did not regard wages as the most important factor for investing in western China, but 
saw it as a clear advantage. These answers might have been affected by the fact that Nordic 
companies are not representative for all foreign companies investing in western China. In the 
interviews the general picture given by the respondents was also that wages in western China is 
lower than in the eastern parts. This would thus lead to an increase in FDI in western China, 
compared to eastern China. In some cases the wages were told to be over 50 percent lower, but the 
consensus was that on average wages were about 70 percent of those in eastern China. Our 
interviews were with companies mainly investing in industries which are not as labor intensive as for 
example, the garment industry. As the respondents in general said that wages for more qualified 
labor was often equivalent to the level in eastern China, they might not have the benefits from the 
lower wage costs in the WDS area.  
The conclusion is that wages indeed affect Nordic company’s decision to invest in western China, but 
that the importance of it differs between companies, industries and the kind of investment made. 
This was surprising as there is strong evidence about the negative impact on FDI in literature and 
because one of our hypotheses was that this was a driving force behind “moving west”. 
9.2 Human Capital 
We did not find any significant effect of the education variable on the inflow of FDI. This is not what 
we expected, since several previous papers have found human capital to be an important factor for 
localization of FDI. Besides not being significant the variable did also have a negative sign in the FE 
regressions, which further shows that the variable did not have any explanatory value. This result can 
have several reasons, either human capital does not affect the localization of investments, or 
secondary school education is a bad proxy variable for human capital. The variable might also suffer 
from the fact that we did not use annual data but rather a linear projection of values from two 
censuses. 
From the interviews we found that human capital was affecting the investment is some cases, but it 
was not always the case that firms found it harder to find quality labor in western China. Both Volvo 
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and Tetrapak expressed little problem to find unqualified labor but had difficulties to find 
experienced manufacturing engineers. This is very different from the answers that were given by 
Oriflame that on the opposite found it easier to recruit skilled labor in the WDS area. This highlights 
how companies might view labor quality very differently. The education level is generally lower in 
western China compared with eastern China. This does not imply that the labor market is a 
disadvantage in the eyes of investors. Our findings from the interviews rather suggest that it might 
be beneficial in some aspects, for example less competition when recruiting talents. 
The variable we use is capturing the general difference in education levels in the different provinces, 
but it is possible that the fraction with senior secondary education is not affecting the investments. It 
could be the case that other measures such as university education would have given a better result. 
However, when you look at the result from the interviews it is clear labor quality is a relative factor 
that is determined by the demand of the companies. As the demand is very different between 
companies it is hard to find a general measure for human capital. This might explain why we do not 
find any clear effect of the education variable. 
Neither from the data analysis, nor from the interviews can we find any clear effect from human 
capital on investment decisions.  Our main conclusion based on the interviews is that the labor 
demand is very different between companies. It is therefore hard to find a measure that captures the 
demand for all companies.  
9.3 Agglomeration 
The regressions give two different results on agglomeration. In the OLS model the variable has the 
expected positive sign and is significant, but when using the FE model it is not significant at all. The 
reasons for this is probably that provinces that have a high FDI level from the beginning, such as 
Beijing and Shanghai, is most likely also the provinces that have reached furthest in their 
urbanization process. Economic development has often come hand in hand with urbanization, and 
urbanization as a sort of agglomeration has been found to have a strong positive effect on 
businesses. When correcting for different intercepts between provinces the variable is no longer 
significant, showing that it is something province specific and not directly affecting FDI.  
Of course, we could have had another result if we had created another variable, such as one with 
density of firms within the same industry in a certain area, or one measuring the granting of 
industrial zones over time. The latter might be better to use as this could affect the companies more 
directly. However, the interviews we held gave us a diverse picture. Some respondents did not care 
about locating in proximity to other firms within the same industry, suppliers or in a cluster, while 
there in some cases was more of importance to do so. In the literature strong evidence of an 
agglomeration effect has been presented for that agglomeration economies have a strong effect on 
localization choices. However, other research has shown that the attractiveness to locate in an area 
to benefit from agglomeration economies is more prominent for some companies than for others.  
The importance also differs between companies, as some might benefit from clustering, while others 
will not. From the interviews it seems like it is companies engaged in manufacturing of some kind, 
that is most attracted by agglomeration. For companies that are selling to a local market locating in 
proximity to competitors might not be as beneficial, as they might lose more than they gain. They are 
therefore more likely to go for the Blue Ocean strategy described earlier in this paper. The conclusion 
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is therefore that there is not clear what effect agglomeration economies have on the localization 
choices of Nordic companies.  
9.4 Infrastructure 
In the regressions we can see that the two infrastructure variables used are not statistically 
significant in any of the regressions executed with the FE model. According to these results 
infrastructure would not have an impact on the decision where to invest. The variable that best 
correlates with our hypotheses of how infrastructure should behave is the highway variable, which 
has a positive sign, but is not significant. This might be because it is a blunt measure, which does not 
completely can describe infrastructure. Including other variables might however be difficult, as most 
of them are constant over time and specific for provinces, such as access to waterways and proximity 
to coastlines. Like the SEZ variable such a variable would be omitted in the FE model, since province 
specific features are included in the intercepts provided by the model.  
The results are much corresponding to our results in the interview part. The general view was that 
infrastructure indeed is a concern when deciding where to invest, but only if whether the 
infrastructure was of a sufficient standard or not. Beyond this level the companies were indifferent 
between where to invest. The basic standard of infrastructure needed will be different between 
companies, as they might use it in different ways. A company which exports most of their products 
would be more interested in good infrastructure than if the investment is a call-center. As an 
example, for the IT companies locating to Chengdu the importance of railways is most likely low.  
An explanation for why infrastructure does not have an impact in our results may also be that the 
Chinese government has invested a lot in infrastructure projects in different regions, and thus 
reducing the difference between provinces. A large part of the initial goals of the WDS was to build 
railways and roads. Overall the infrastructure in western China was described as good. Especially 
when it came to air transportation, but also the supply of internet and telecommunications seemed 
to be of good standard and on level with other parts of China.  
In the literature infrastructure is presented as an important variable for attracting FDI in general, and 
in most papers it has a positive significant effect on FDI. As we have used measures similar to that of 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) and Ljungwall and Linde-Rahr (2005) among others. These papers also 
showed a positive effect of infrastructure on FDI. However, Coughlin and Segev (1999) did not found 
that their “Hiway” variable (total length of paved roadway in a province, divided by its area), had a 
significant on FDI inflow in China. 
The conclusion is that infrastructure is not among the more important factors for Nordic companies 
to locate in the WDS area. It might be overall, but not specifically to the locations where the 
interviewed companies have invested. The only objection against this conclusion is that almost all of 
the Nordic companies that have invested in the WDS area have done it in Chongqing and Chengdu. 
These are large cities, aspiring to become the new Shanghai and Beijing and have good infrastructure 
both of them. Chengdu for example opened up a railway line to Lodz in Poland in the spring of 2013. 
The infrastructure in other provinces might thus prevent companies from investing there, but this we 
do not know. 
43 
 
9.5 Markets 
We find that the per capita gross regional product have a positive effect on FDI stock. The finding is 
in accordance with our expectations that GRP as a measure for local market size would have positive 
effect on investments. Similarly we find that several of the interviewed company’s mention markets 
as the main reason behind their investment in western China. All of the companies saw their 
investments in western China as a step in their expansion on the Chinese market, instead of 
producing for export. Previously export oriented production have been an important target when 
investing in China, however this has lost importance in recent year as several foreign companies look 
at the potential of the Chinese markets. In this development the local market becomes a more 
important measure for inward FDI. In other words the importance of GRP as an explanatory variable 
for FDI is increasing when China is becoming an important market rather than only a producer.  
When we examined Nordic companies in western China, it was striking that so few were present in 
the WDS area. Nordic companies in China are almost exclusively present in the most developed 
coastal regions. It shows which important driver the local market is for localization. This is consistent 
with our findings in the data analysis about how GRP levels affect FDI. This result is also similar to the 
findings by Cheng and Kwan (2000), who found a positive impact of average income on FDI.   
9.6 Policy Variable for WDS area 
Both dummy variables are significant and have the expected positive effect. The significance 
increases for the 2005 variable, which shows that the effects of the policy have become stronger in 
later years. This is reasonable, since it takes time to implement this kind of policies. The variable 
shows that the growth in FDI has been larger in the WDS area in later years. The variable does not 
tell us the reason for this development, however. It is reasonable to believe that the preferential 
policy environment could be a major reason for the result. This suggests that the efforts from the 
Chinese government’s side have been successful.  
The findings correlate with the hypothesis that preferential policy is affecting the localization of FDI. 
The WDS has meant several preferential policies, including taxes, easier financing and a generally 
better treatment of foreign firms. Our findings cannot tell which of these effects that has had the 
largest effect, but suggest that the joint effect has been positive. That the variables did not give any 
result in the OLS regression might depend on the fact that there is a large difference between 
provinces that the OLS regression does not take in to account.  
The connection between the investment decision and the WDS is somewhat complex to analyze 
based on the findings from the interviews. When we discussed taxes the general answer was that 
this was affecting investment decisions. The background research suggests that the tax lever should 
be lower in western China; however this is something we have not been able to confirm in our 
interviews. From a firm perspective tax level is something that is negotiated with the local tax office, 
and is determined based on how well the firms profile fits the strategy of the city. It is still possible 
that the tax level in western China is lower on an aggregated level, something that we have not 
analyzed. Thus tax might still be contributing to the high investments in the WDS area.  
Something that we could conclude is that the local government in the WDS area is working hard to 
attract FDI. We did also find that the governments are trying decrease the bureaucracy, and is 
working actively together with the companies to resolve problems. A good example of this was the 
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Chengdu “one-stop” initiative to speed up the decision process of the government. A business 
friendly environment is making the area more attractive for companies as they then can focus on 
their operations rather that government bureaucracy. From the interviews we find that the business 
friendly environment and the active work of the local governments to be important factor in the 
increased investments in the area. 
10 Concluding remarks 
By analyzing the regional distribution of FDI in China we have been able to determine the effect of 
different factors on FDI. We find that the increase in FDI has been particularly strong in the western 
regions which suggest that the WDS strategy has been successful. This view is also strengthened by 
the fact that the effect becomes more significant over time. We find that GRP has a positive effect on 
investments suggesting that the local markets are important to investors. Compared with previous 
research we can confirm the picture that business surveys previously have given, that the Chinese 
market is becoming increasingly important to MNE’s in China.  Further, we find that wage has a 
negative effect on foreign investments. Infrastructure and education level are not found to have any 
effect on the localization on FDI. The different results in the two regressions clearly show how much 
differences between provinces affect the result.   
Nordic companies are found in several different industries, why the answers differ some. The 
answers in interviews do also suggest local markets to be the main factor for the investments among 
Nordic companies. For the manufacturing companies agglomeration was also an important factor, 
which could not be concluded in the regressions. In general the answers from our interviews 
conform to the findings from the data analysis. The exception is wage which is not found to be as 
important by Nordic investors as the data analysis suggests. We believe the main reason behind this 
is that Nordic companies are generally engaged in more advanced industries where wage is a 
relatively smaller cost. The fact that most present companies are large is consistent with the 
interview finding that corruption and government relations are affecting the firms. This is because 
smaller firms have smaller resources to work with government relations and might not be given as 
preferential treatment as larger firms.  
Our findings suggest that the WDS has had effect on the FDI inflow to western China. However it is 
hard to draw any clear conclusions from the interviews on the effect of the WDS. The interviews 
suggests that there are a generally business friendly environment in western China and that local 
governments are working actively to attract investments. At the same time companies does not find 
that the tax levels are lower in general in the west. It could be hard to find the effects from a large 
policy like the WDS for individual firms since the strategy might affect indirectly. Therefore the 
aggregated analysis might give a better result.  
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Appendix 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 1997-2012 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Expected 
sign 
FDI overall 485.7796 833.4151 2.3882 5728.508 N = 465  
 between  4.133742 2950.15  T = 15  
 within  -1347.04 3689.879    
        
GRP overall 17320.98 15021.61 2250 85213 N = 465 Pos 
 between  6252.4 47963.2  T = 15  
 within  -10022.15 65059.25    
        
Education overall .112757 .0424349 .0093413 0.2264593 N = 465 Pos 
 between  .0303856 .1897101  T = 15  
 within  .0535109 .1720031    
        
Wage overall 19462.14 12768.67 4889 77031 N = 465 Neg 
 between  14698.2 37144.53  T = 15  
 within  -6257.398 60185    
        
Agglomeration overall 43.2526 16.54433 12.85 92.94 N = 465 Pos 
 between  21.31266 88.1977  T = 15  
 within  29.67691 57.68691    
        
Expressways overall 12.02066 17.6187 0 127.1293 N = 465 Pos 
 between  .0006697 64.99474  T = 15  
 within  -42.87945 74.15526    
        
Highways overall .4300865 .3699262 .005858 1.905994 N = 465 Pos 
 between  .0134224 1.253428  T = 15  
 within  -.1999976 1.082652    
        
Railways overall .0168265 .0154752 0 .0748548 N = 465 Pos 
 between  .0001745 .0695038  T = 15  
 within  .0037066 .0425843    
        
SEZ overall .0645161 .2459347 0 1 N = 465 Pos 
 between  0 1  T=15  
  within   .0645161 .0645161       
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Appendix 2 – Respondents 
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